decision making is a key skill in any field at any scale. but that first requires knowing and deciding on which variables are relevant. making it a key skill in itself.
on a tangential note, I liked the paragraph on household management and economist Emily Oster's point on households/families being the original unit of organization... since 'Economics' come from greek "οἰκονόμος" meaning household management.
knowing how to run households is the OG of resource allocation and decision making!
And note that "the better tech" is mostly in Command/Control/Communications/Intelligence (C3I) and that the Intelligence is "tactical" in nature. (We can see the enemy before they can see us, on the battlefield; and we know where WE are and where THEY are NOT. Not exactly spy vs spy stuff). And C3I is a sibling of (if not a subset of) ... Logistics!
re "boy's" interest in war/etc - I agree with that general point, and find war metaphors for business tedious (because I stay at early-stage where it's not a ZeroSum Game).... but it's worth noting that Richards' book came out in 2004, not too long after the combo of 9/11 and 4GW discussions.
So bummed I had to split this up over multiple parts, because I go into the part about "war metaphors for business are tedious because business isn't zero sum" in Part II. But thank you so much for these links! I am indeed interested in reading all of these and expect I'll reflect on them as well in Part III (or IV) depending on how much substack yells at me for length.
Honestly, I really like the tootstorm structure as a medium, but I can't imagine trying to fit this behemoth into that format. I barely managed to break it into 3 essays and it took me roughly six months to wrangle my thoughts enough to make it *this* readable.
I will not repeat EVERY rant that came to me while I was reading this piece; at least partially because none of them are directed at the author (Indeed I am in loud agreement).
But I will leave some carefully curated pieces of mind..
"Clever blitzkrieg strategy" is one reason why the Germans lost the Battle of the Bulge - their logistics couldn't keep up EVEN BEFORE the USAAF's fighter-bombers were able to fly again, and were able interdict the Heer's lines of supply as they had been doing ever since D-Day. While the movie exaggerates for dramatic effect the state of supply of the attackers, the "clever plan" was entirely unworkable with the logistics situation they had.
The "secret" to the US domination of their enemies in (almost) every military conflict since 1917 has been logistics and "operational research." Which I guess is "technology" if you squint right, but (and I've said this innumerable times) "The US Way To Win Wars is to waddle up to our enemy and bury them under piles of stuff." Ford Trucks. Esso Gasoline. Liberty Shops. Motorola Radios. Artillery Division Time on Target salvos. The M4 Sherman that burned out Monday, was rebuilt Tuesday, and back on the line Wednesday. (WWII examples, because there are so many).
Now, logistics is a force multiplier - so, yes, Better Stuff means better results when we bury our enemies under that stuff. But if you only have one of something, it'll get buried instead....
(There's a common misconception that, because the WWII German Military "used blitzkrieg" they must have been a highly-mechanized force. In many ways, they were the least or second least mechanized major military in WWII. Their logistics was largely horse-borne, and where it wasn't, it was a mess of captured and non-compatible, often civilian grade, barely motorized transport)
Thanks so much for offering this insight! As I mentioned above I'm not super familiar with post 1812 military actions, so getting this perspective was a nice confirmation of my gut level "wait what?"
decision making is a key skill in any field at any scale. but that first requires knowing and deciding on which variables are relevant. making it a key skill in itself.
on a tangential note, I liked the paragraph on household management and economist Emily Oster's point on households/families being the original unit of organization... since 'Economics' come from greek "οἰκονόμος" meaning household management.
knowing how to run households is the OG of resource allocation and decision making!
Oh, I didn't know that about the etymology of economics! Thank you for sharing, and for reading the article -- definitely longer than my usual 😂
i noticed Boyd in the title and i happen to be reading up a bit on OODA loops, meaning this and part 2 has got to be a sign! so thank you 😁
enjoyed reading both parts over my morning round of coffee ☕
Oh what fun serendipity!
And if you want a GOOD argument about "the side with better tech wins" - see Prof Deverau's discussion of The Modern System in this post https://acoup.blog/2020/03/20/collections-why-dont-we-use-chemical-weapons-anymore/
And note that "the better tech" is mostly in Command/Control/Communications/Intelligence (C3I) and that the Intelligence is "tactical" in nature. (We can see the enemy before they can see us, on the battlefield; and we know where WE are and where THEY are NOT. Not exactly spy vs spy stuff). And C3I is a sibling of (if not a subset of) ... Logistics!
I do so love me some Devereaux! I think I've actually read that piece already, but the insight that intelligence is tactical was interesting.
Tangentially relevant, but so funny that I have to include it:
“If you encounter a unit you can’t identify, fire one round over their heads so it won’t hit anyone.
“If the response is a fusillade of rapid, precise rifle fire, they’re British.
“If the response is a s**tstorm of machine-gun fire, they’re German.
“If they throw down their arms and surrender, they’re Italian.
“And if nothing happens for five minutes and then your position is obliterated by support artillery or an airstrike, they’re American.”
lmao this was great, thank you.
re "boy's" interest in war/etc - I agree with that general point, and find war metaphors for business tedious (because I stay at early-stage where it's not a ZeroSum Game).... but it's worth noting that Richards' book came out in 2004, not too long after the combo of 9/11 and 4GW discussions.
http://webseitz.fluxent.com/wiki/CertainToWin
http://webseitz.fluxent.com/wiki/FourGw
You might be interested in Rao's piece connecting parallel/lagging tracks of change between warfare and management.
https://breakingsmart.substack.com/p/fifth-generation-management
highlights http://webseitz.fluxent.com/wiki/2020-09-25-RaoFifthgenerationManagement
Also Cedric Chin's pieces on learning and decision-making under changing/ill-structured environments/domains.
https://commoncog.com/dancing-landscapes-in-business/
http://webseitz.fluxent.com/wiki/2022-09-20-ChinDancingLandscapesInBusiness
So bummed I had to split this up over multiple parts, because I go into the part about "war metaphors for business are tedious because business isn't zero sum" in Part II. But thank you so much for these links! I am indeed interested in reading all of these and expect I'll reflect on them as well in Part III (or IV) depending on how much substack yells at me for length.
or you could make a toot-storm
Honestly, I really like the tootstorm structure as a medium, but I can't imagine trying to fit this behemoth into that format. I barely managed to break it into 3 essays and it took me roughly six months to wrangle my thoughts enough to make it *this* readable.
I will not repeat EVERY rant that came to me while I was reading this piece; at least partially because none of them are directed at the author (Indeed I am in loud agreement).
But I will leave some carefully curated pieces of mind..
"Clever blitzkrieg strategy" is one reason why the Germans lost the Battle of the Bulge - their logistics couldn't keep up EVEN BEFORE the USAAF's fighter-bombers were able to fly again, and were able interdict the Heer's lines of supply as they had been doing ever since D-Day. While the movie exaggerates for dramatic effect the state of supply of the attackers, the "clever plan" was entirely unworkable with the logistics situation they had.
The "secret" to the US domination of their enemies in (almost) every military conflict since 1917 has been logistics and "operational research." Which I guess is "technology" if you squint right, but (and I've said this innumerable times) "The US Way To Win Wars is to waddle up to our enemy and bury them under piles of stuff." Ford Trucks. Esso Gasoline. Liberty Shops. Motorola Radios. Artillery Division Time on Target salvos. The M4 Sherman that burned out Monday, was rebuilt Tuesday, and back on the line Wednesday. (WWII examples, because there are so many).
Now, logistics is a force multiplier - so, yes, Better Stuff means better results when we bury our enemies under that stuff. But if you only have one of something, it'll get buried instead....
(There's a common misconception that, because the WWII German Military "used blitzkrieg" they must have been a highly-mechanized force. In many ways, they were the least or second least mechanized major military in WWII. Their logistics was largely horse-borne, and where it wasn't, it was a mess of captured and non-compatible, often civilian grade, barely motorized transport)
Thanks so much for offering this insight! As I mentioned above I'm not super familiar with post 1812 military actions, so getting this perspective was a nice confirmation of my gut level "wait what?"